The Extent of the Power of Love in Social and Political Change
A mass of missiles, chlorine gas, and nerve agent chemical weapons attack the innocent civilians of Syria.[1] Brutal, violent prisons dressed up as “reeducation” centers target Uighur Muslims.[2] “Indiscriminate attacks against civilians…unlawful killings, beatings, arbitrary detentions, torture, sexual violence, recruitment and use of child soldiers” plague Sudan.[3] All around the world, a countless number of human rights violations and atrocities are occurring. From this image of reality, it may seem like we have lost our sense of humanity, more or less our sense of love for each other and the world. But not all hope is lost, for love takes on many forms, including power. The power of love can create movements, protests, and national reform, from the legalization of gay marriage to protecting DACA students in the United States of America. But, these grand, inspirational changes to our world are possible through the conversation of love and harmony among politicians, activists, and civilians. In fact, a core issue lying in this conversation is the extent of the power of love: whether love can move people, society, and beyond; whether love is sufficient or is a necessary agent to bring moral change to the world. With careful analysis, we recognize there is an urgent question at the heart of this conversation: What is the role of love in social and political change? We can answer this question by first assessing whether the different accounts of love — such as parental, romantic, friendship, love of individuals, or love of planet –are variations of a single phenomenon, or whether they constitute different phenomena. By establishing the framework on the accounts of love, we can find immense clarity to the role of love in social and political change.
It is of the utmost importance to find the answer to this pressing question because love has a large impact on human behavior, including behavior towards real-life atrocities. Without an understanding of the role of love in social and political change, there will be detrimental consequences such as neglecting and disrespecting the power of love between each other and with the world. Furthermore, a lack of a thorough answer to this pressing question can leave us with nothing to trust and no one to trust, for there is no chance of unity among polarizing individuals; nor would there be any motivation for moral change — including social and political change — within ourselves, our community, and the world at large.
In this essay, I will find the answer to the question of the role of love in social and political change by first understanding the definitions of love explained by philosophers Harry Frankfurt, Myisha Cherry, and Cheryl Hall. I will thoroughly analyze the accounts of love proposed by these philosophers. This will enable me to construct a framework that encompasses the motivation of love. Specifically, I will find what motivates love and how it impacts our interpersonal relationships. Ultimately, I will show how love can become sufficient for moral change. In the process of this essay, I will introduce the notion of toxic love in order to reject the potential objection that toxic love cannot be accounted for as a form of love. I will then show how toxic love is an account of love but not an effective agent for moral change.
I find Frankfurt’s theory of love to be critical to the conversation of the role of love in social and political change by recognizing the universal idea that love is a source of motivation. In Reasons of Love, Harry Frankfurt defines love as a disinterested concern for the beloved that consists of three characteristics. Firstly, he argues that love is not within “our direct and immediate voluntary control.”[4] While the individual may resist or neglect the object of their love, they will ultimately be unable to abandon it.
Secondly, Frankfurt argues that the object of love is out of “volitional necessity, which consists essentially in limitation of the will.”[5] In other words, the individual has no willpower to drop the object of their love even if alternatives were available. While the individual has some free will in the sense of prioritizing the objects of their love, ultimately, the individual would be “willing to harm [one object of love] in order to protect some other love.”[6]
Thirdly, the object of love is “ineluctably particular” and thereby irreplaceable. Given these characteristics of love, Frankfurt ultimately argues that the “origins of normativity…lie in the contingent necessities of love.”[7] To clarify, Frankfurt argues that any notion of reasoning or conception of a norm is derived from love. In the general account of love provided by Frankfurt, any object of love — paternal, romantic, love for planet — is possible so as long as the three distinguishing characteristics are met. Since the object of love is not within the individual’s control, their reasoning and motivation will always be inspired by the constrained will from the volitional necessity of love.
In addition to Frankfurt’s theory of love, I find Cherry’s account of love to be essential to the conversation of the role love in social and political change by clearly defining agape love and its compatibility with moral anger. In “Love, Anger, and Racial Injustice”, she recognizes agape love as a universal love that is larger than two individuals and encompasses society as a whole. She distinguishes agape love from philia love. Philia love requires “mutuality”[8] — this type of love is directed and returned back to the individual. Furthermore, philia love responds to “good qualities in the beloved.”[9] While philia love requires these conditions to be met, agape love does not require these conditions. Rather, agape love is considered to be unconditional love: this act of “loving a person for their own sake” [10] is directed to an entire community.
With the definition of agape love in mind, Cherry defines and distinguishes moral anger from hatred in order to highlight the compatibility between agape love and moral anger. Cherry defines moral anger as an active virtue that aims to bring “changes to any societal structures that affirm the false notion that the…people of the wrongdoer’s social class is superior.”[11] This statement defines moral anger with two critical criteria. First, moral anger aims to bring change. Secondly, moral anger aims to bring the offender to a “level of equality” to the angry moral agent by recognizing the wrongdoer’s failure to humanity.[12] In contrast to moral anger, hatred is passive and does not seek to bring change to a community. Rather, hatred aims to divide individuals, rejecting understanding and other people’s character and humanity.
By extending sympathy and compassion “toward an enemy,” agape love becomes compatible with moral anger.[13] This is because both moral anger and agape love are “active” emotions that seek to bring change.[14] The ability to communicate sympathy and compassion on an equal moral standing level is only possible through agape love: a universal love for the beloved, that does not require responding to any particular qualities of another individual, but rather loving them “for their own sake.”[15] As a result, two individuals with differences can stand in equal moral standings and are able to communicate their need for moral change through sympathy and compassion.
Furthermore, Cherry finds it necessary for agape love to be compatible with moral anger to bring about moral change, specifically combating against racial injustices. For instance, suppose there is a town divided on police brutality. Some individuals believe that police brutality exists and targets black and brown people disproportionality; other individuals believe that police brutality does not exist and argue that people are not respecting police orders. Through agape love, individuals with polarizing beliefs will recognize that each of them has an equal moral standing, such that no one is better than the other. By lending sympathy and compassion to the anti-police-brutality advocates (who express fear and concern for the safety of people of color) and lending sympathy and compassion to the Blue Lives Matter advocates (who express fear and concern for the respect and safety of police officers), the polarizing individuals can communicate a need for moral change: to respect and protect people of color and likewise respect and recognize fair police officers. This can be achieved through effective legislative reform — such as strict regulations on police departments and holding officers accountable for their actions — and civil discourse, such as recognizing the power dynamic between people of color and police officers. Ultimately, this example illustrates how the universality of agape love and its compatibility to moral anger answers to a love for humanity by seeking active moral change in the community and beyond.
Just as Cherry recognizes agape love for humanity, Cheryl Hall also recognizes an object of love that is also abstract: environmental integrity. To emphasize, I find Hall’s theory love to be equally important to the conversation of the power of love in social and political change by recognizing her belief that love is necessary. Cheryl Hall defines love as “an abiding commitment to act on behalf of another” with “reasonably steadfast action in support of another’s well-being.”[16] Specifically, Hall defines “true love” consisting of caring perception and caring action. Hall emphasizes that love for the planet is necessary in order to protect, preserve, and restore the well-being of human life as well as the remaining life on Earth[17]. Even though Hall recognizes that self-preservation is an acceptable position for the love of the planet, she argues it is not enough to bring continuous preservation and restoration of life on Earth. Instead, she argues that love for environmental integrity is necessary for its own sake. With this necessity, there can be “loving attention” to the web of life. This in turn would strengthen others’ instrumental reason for environmental integrity and bring effective change and preservation of the web of life.[18] For example, some individuals may value environmental integrity as an instrument: reducing carbon emissions preserves good air quality for their children to breathe, or not cutting down numerous trees allows individuals to keep their beautiful, forested backyard. But self-preservation and instrumental reasoning are not enough: it will always be limited in the motivation for change. Furthermore, if environmental integrity was supported only by self-preservation, individuals may pursue fossil fuels because they are cheaper, even if the dangerous yet cheaper alternative may jeopardize the future of life on Earth. On the other hand, through valuing environmental integrity for its own sake, caring perception of the environment can lead to caring action such as political reform or advocacy that is very effective in preserving the web of life. Hall believes this is possible through the perception that the “web of life itself is fundamentally valuable” and taking action on that perception.[19]
Having established the three accounts of love, we can explore the similarities and differences between the three theories of love defined by Frankfurt, Cherry, and Hall. A large similarity among the three philosophers is the notion that love for an object is for its own sake. Frankfurt defines this is as “disinterested concern,”[20] whereas, Cherry defines this as “no mention of the self,” which means that love is not due to instrumental value nor self-interested value.[21] Hall emphasizes that loving “the web of life” is perceiving its fundamental value for its own sake.[22] Thus, all three philosophers share the notion of the final valuing for the beloved.
While Frankfurt agrees with Hall and Cherry that love is the source of motivation, Hall and Cherry further argue that love brings about moral change. In light of Cherry’s account of love, agape love is compatible with moral anger by actively seeking “resistance to injustice” and “restoration for the beloved community” through sympathy and compassion.[23] The nature of agape love is impartial and directed towards all individuals, thereby bringing moral change to society as a whole. Likewise, Hall’s account of love requires “caring action and caring perception” to bring about moral change in the form of preservation and restoration of the web of life on Earth.[24]
However, there is a subtle distinction between Cherry’s account of love and Hall’s account of love: Cherry believes love is compatible with moral anger to combat injustice with whereas Hall does not believe in the compatibility of love with moral anger; rather, she believes love is “not sufficient, [but] is still necessary.”[25] Specifically, Hall emphasizes that a particular kind of political and economic institution and technology are needed to establish habits and social change to an effective degree along with the love for the web of life on Earth. On the other hand, Cherry believes that agape love is active with the aim to restore the community. The desire for “restoration” and “resistance to injustice” is largely uncompromising.[26] Therefore, the compatibility of moral anger to agape love produces a stronger motivation for social and political change.
Having distinguished the similarities and differences among the theories of love among Frankfurt, Cherry, and Hall, we find the answer to the proposed question in two critical, necessary parts. To emphasize, the first criterion is necessary for the second criterion to exist as a framework of the accounts of love. First, we find consensus in a single phenomenon of love, such that love is the source of motivation. Secondly, we recognize that the different forms of love constitute this single phenomenon. The different forms of love defined by Cherry and Hall emphasize how love brings a moral change in society. Since moral change is a key component of normativity, of reasoning as a whole, we recognize their accounts of love to be part of the larger phenomenon of love as the source of motivation. As depicted by Figure 1, Cherry and Hall’s accounts of love are part of Frankfurt’s general account of love.
To emphasize, Cherry and Hall are distinguishable in the extent of moral anger’s compatibility with love. Hall does not recognize moral anger nor indignation as a compatible agent to love, whereas Cherry recognizes that love is compatible with moral anger. So, while Hall recognizes that love is necessary for social and political change, Cherry emphasizes that love alone is not a strong enough motivation for social and political change. In fact, she firmly believes that it is necessary for agape love to be compatible with moral anger in order to have a stronger motivation and a more effective agent for moral change. This is well demonstrated in Cherry’s explanation of how “moral anger is an expression of agape love.”[27] Through moral anger, an individual can demonstrate not only concern for “their treatment of others and ourselves but…. also [concern] for their moral well-being.” [28] And so moral anger serves as a form of criticism of other individuals and society at large. Moral anger thereby serves as “an expression of agape love” by showing concern for “the moral improvement of others” and “aims to reform and repair the moral community.”[29] Thus, Cherry finds it necessary for agape love to be compatible with moral anger in order to have a strong motivation for social and political change.
With this framework in mind, I propose that moral anger is necessary to a very critical degree — such that it is the final element to make love sufficient for moral change. To reiterate, in light of the theories of love as defined by Hall and Cherry, the power of love extends only to the point that love necessary for political and social change. This is because love motivates conversation, advocacy, legislative reform, and ultimately the grand scheme of political and social change. Love alone cannot cause political and social change. Hence, I argue that the combination of agape love and moral anger, along with caring action and perception, produces a stronger agent for social and political change.
For instance, love alone cannot solve the crisis of police brutality and systematic racism. By recognizing agape love’s compatibility with moral anger, we recognize that polarizing individuals seek active change in their community and these individuals engage in civil discourse. Through caring action and perception, advocacy can be informative, passionate, and motivating to bring effective legislative reform in the state and federal level of policing and government. This will ultimately lead to large, sweeping social change — such as the change in the perception and reaction to police brutality and systematic racism — and political change, such as a change in leadership and holding individuals, institutions and corporations, and political agents more accountable. Therefore, love that is compatible and present with moral anger, along with caring action and caring perception, is sufficient for moral change, specifically social and political change.
One may argue that the framework is illegitimate by proposing how toxic love is incompatible with the framework presented on the account of love. One example of toxic love would be selfish love — love that is so self-centered that it results in abandoning everyone else, even those in a dire, fatal situation. Toxic love can be considered under the general account of love where love is a source of motivation. In this general account, toxic love can be best viewed in Frankfurt’s understanding of the prioritization of love. That is, toxic love would be directed towards the object that has the highest priority for the individual, such as themselves. An individual can be so motivated by their own needs that they make love for themselves and their interests — like a job promotion or money — a higher priority than their love for their friends, family, or loved ones.
Having established the essence of toxic love under the general account of love, we can clearly see that this account of love cannot fall under the account of love shared by Chery and Hall. To emphasize, toxic love, including selfish love, is incapable of bringing moral change — it may excite moral change, but it is not universal enough to bring about societal moral change. This is likely due to the limitation of the toxic love: the final valuing of the beloved only extends to a self-absorbed degree: this selfish love cannot go beyond the individual. For instance, suppose an individual loves the rainforest for its own sake. However, the extent of this love for the rainforest is limited by the highest priority, which is assigned to the individuals' own desires to build large farmland. Such an individual’s love for the rainforest would be a lower priority compared to their selfish love, which prioritizes establishing a large farm on the plot of land. The individual may feel guilty for destroying the rainforest, but ultimately, they would feel that their love for the farmland has a larger priority over the integrity of the rainforest.
In fact, Hall would argue selfish love would lead to “ignorance and neglect [that] can be as damaging as disdain and abuse.”[30] To emphasize, since selfish love is solely based on internal motivations, no amount of pressure can cause a selfish-loving individual to care about something beyond their own desires. As a result, there is a lack of knowledge and motivation to pursue anything beyond one’s own desires. In the earlier example regarding love for the rainforest, selfish love prevents the individual from obtaining knowledge and motivation to provide “care that is substantial, reliable, sustainable, and truly attuned to the needs” of the rainforest.[31]
Furthermore, Cherry would argue that any universality of toxic love may actually be hatred, an emotion that is passive and uninterested in bringing change. An individual that is solely motivated internally would not be able to extend sympathy and compassion to other individuals. As a result, the selfish-loving individual would be uninterested in bringing moral change. For instance, in regard to combating racial injustice, a selfish-loving individual would likely argue that housing discrimination or any other form of racial injustice does not directly impact them, so it is not a concern for them. And so the individual would not be able to extend sympathy nor compassion to another individual who is a victim of these practices of racial injustice. As a result, there is no motivation for conversation, no motivation for seeking understanding, and ultimately no motivation to seek social and political change within society.
So, while toxic love is legitimate in the general account of love — love as a source of motivation — toxic love is ineffective to bring about social and political change due to its limited nature as a passive emotion that only extends to a self-absorbed degree.
In conclusion, we have established the extent to which love can bring about social and political change. First, we recognize the three accounts of love defined by Frankfurt, Cherry, and Hall. The three accounts reveal how variations of accounts of love constitute a large single phenomenon that defines a very general account of love. Frankfurt provides a very general account of love, which states that the source of motivation is love. Cherry and Hall fall under Frankfurt’s general account through the shared belief that love brings moral change. Furthermore, Cherry and Hall differ from one another from a subtle difference: Hall believes love is necessary, whereas Cherry believes it is necessary for agape love to be compatible with moral anger to produce a more effective agent for moral change, specifically social and political change. I combine parts of Hall’s theory and Cherry’s theory of love to argue that moral anger is the final element to making love sufficient enough to bring about moral change. Hence, I argue that love that is compatible with moral anger, along with caring action and caring perception, is sufficient to bring moral change, specifically social and political change.
Hence, belittling the power of love is illegitimate in light of this framework. Rather, love is a strong, active, volitional necessity that encourages action in the moral agent seeking moral change. Love is capable of bringing moral change: love is present and can be active in combating the human rights crisis present in Syria, China, Sudan, the United States of America, and across the globe. Cherry showed us agape love is compatible with moral anger to combat racial injustice, thereby revealing love has a critical role in dismantling systematic racism. Likewise, Hall showed us how love — through caring perception and action — is necessary to bring change to policy regarding environmental integrity. This also reveals love is capable of educating generations of climatic issues and preserving the complex web of life on Earth. Most importantly, love that is compatible with moral anger, along with caring action and perception, is sufficient for moral change. Ultimately, love is capable of recognizing differences among individuals; showing compassion and sympathy to the angered and hurt; reaching compromise and discourse; and empowering each and every individual with the power to bring progressive, positive change to a world darkened by humanitarian crises.[i]
I wrote this paper for the course Expository Writing: Exploring the Philosophy of Love. I would like to extend acknowledgment and gratitude to Professor Sandy Koullas and the Johns Hopkins University Writing Center for contributing advice and input for this paper.
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Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy edited by Adrienne M. Martin, 215–226. New York, NY: Routledge, 2 018.
Jakes, Lara. “U.S. Concludes Syria Used Chemical Weapons in May Attack.” New York Times,
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Schifrin, Nick and Sagalyn, Dan. “China calls it re-education, but Uighur Muslims say it’s ‘unbearable brutality’.” PBS NewsHour, October 4, 2019. Accessed November 16, 2019.
“South Sudan.” Human Rights Watch, last modified 2019.
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In-Text Citations
[1] Lara Jakes, “U.S. Concludes Syria Used Chemical Weapons in May Attack,” New York Times, September 26, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/world/middleeast/syria-chemical-weapons-us.html.
[2] Nick, Schifrin and Dan Sagalyn, “China calls it re-education, but Uighur Muslims say it’s ‘unbearable brutality’,” PBS NewsHour, October 4, 2019, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/china-calls-it-re-education-but-uyghur-muslims-say-its-unbearable-brutality.
[3] “South Sudan Events of 2018,” Human Rights Watch, last modified 2019, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/south-sudan.
[4] Harry G. Frankfurt, in The Reasons of Love (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2004), 44.
[5] Frankfurt, 46.
[6] Frankfurt, 46.
[7] Frankfurt, 48.
[8] Myisha Cherry, “Love, Anger, and Racial Injustice,” in Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy, ed. Adrienne M. Martin, 1 [edition] (New York: Routledge, 2019), 158
[9] Cherry, 158.
[10] Cherry, 158.
[11] Cherry, 160.
[12] Cherry, 161.
[13] Cherry, 159.
[14] Cherry, 163.
[15] Cherry, 158.
[16] Hall, 217.
[17] Hall, 217.
[18] Hall, 221.
[19] Hall, 223.
[20] Frankfurt, 42.
[21] Cherry, 159.
[22] Hall, 218.
[23] Cherry, 158.
[24] Hall, 217.
[25] Hall, 223.
[26] Cherry, 159.
[27] Cherry, 164.
[28] Cherry, 165.
[29] Cherry, 167.
[30] Hall, 216.
[31] Hall, 221.